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Interventions to Control Virus Transmission during an Outbreak of Ebola
Hemorrhagic Fever: Experience from Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 1995
Barbara Kerstie ¨ns and Francine Matthys Me ￿decins sans Frontie `res, Brussels, Belgium
On 6 May 1995, the Me ￿decins sans Frontie `res (MSF) coordinator in Kinshasa, Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo (DRC), received a request for assistance for what was believed to be a concurrent
outbreak of bacillary dysentery and viral hemorrhagic fever (suspected Ebola hemorrhagic fever
[EHF]) in the town of Kikwit, DRC. On 11 May, the MSF intervention team assessed Kikwit
General Hospital. This initial assessment revealed a nonfunctional isolation ward for suspected
EHF cases; a lack of water and electricity; no waste disposal system; and no protective gear for
medical staff. The priorities set by MSF were to establish a functional isolation ward to deal with
EHF and to distribute protective supplies to individuals who were involved with patient care. Before
the intervention, 67 health workers contracted EHF; after the initiation of control measures, just 3
cases were reported among health staff and none among Red Cross volunteers involved in body
burial.
contacts with health authorities in Kikwit, mention was made of Me ￿decins Sans Frontie `res (MSF) is a nongovernmental orga-
an unusually high number of cases of ‘‘bloody diarrhea,’’ sus- nization that lends assistance, without discrimination and irre-
pected by some to be bacillary dysentery, and some cases suspected spective of race, religion, creed, or political afﬁliation, to popu-
to be viral hemorrhagic fever, possibly due to Ebola (EBO) virus. lations in precarious situations and to victims of disasters and
The decision was made on 8 May to send a team from Europe to conﬂict. The international movement is represented by 19 na-
Kikwit to set up an emergency intervention. As a result of this
tional sections. Each section functions autonomously, but coor- decision, shipments of medicines, medical equipment, water, and
dination is achieved through a single international council. The sanitation equipment were prepared in Brussels and sent to Kikwit.
Belgian section of MSF has been implementing health projects The content of this shipment was determined by the hypothesized
in several districts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo absence of any barrier-nursing supplies in the hospitals and health
(DRC) since 1985. On 6 May 1995, the MSF coordinator in centers and the need for an adequate supply of water and disinfec-
tant to deal with an outbreak of an infectious disease likely to be Kinshasa, DRC, received a request for assistance from a physi-
transmitted through contact with fomites. Some of these supplies cian at a private voluntary organization with which MSF was
were standardized kits and some were special purchases that were collaborating. The physician requested help for what was be-
made because of the possibility of an EBO hemorrhagic fever lieved to be a concurrent outbreak of bacillary dysentery and
(EHF) outbreak (table 1). viral hemorrhagic fever in the town of Kikwit, DRC.
The diagnosis of EHF was conﬁrmed by the Centers for Disease Herein, we describe some of the common problems encoun-
Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta on 10 May. On 11 May,
tered in the African health care setting, certain aspects of the an MSF intervention team—1 physician, 1 sanitation expert, and
international response to those problems, and the MSF ap- 1 logistician—arrived in Kikwit from Brussels. At that time, 76
proach to assessing and setting up adequate health infrastruc- suspected cases of EHF had been identiﬁed, of which 57 had died.
tures during a medical emergency. Most patients suspected of having EHF were hospitalized in
pavilion 3 of Kikwit General Hospital. Although this ward had
been earmarked as an isolation ward for the treatment of suspected
The Initial Situation EBO cases, it was not physically isolated from the rest of the
hospital and not clearly identiﬁable as a special isolation unit. The
Kikwit is a town with an estimated 200,000 inhabitants and two majority of patients were lying on the ﬂoor of the ward, and family
hospitals (Kikwit General Hospital and Kikwit II Hospital). The members walked in and out. Bodies were lying unburied in the
in-country coordinator of ongoing MSF projects was notiﬁed as hospital, and used needles and other contaminated equipment were
early as 6 May 1995 of an ongoing disease outbreak, which had not scattered about. The staff (1 physician and 3 nurses), who had
been diagnosed etiologically, in Kikwit. Following MSF’s initial volunteered to care for the patients, were working without adequate
protection. Under these conditions, the risk of becoming infected
for both health care providers and family members was judged to
be extremely high. Furthermore, the staff had not received salaries
Reprints orcorrespondence (current afﬁliation):Dr. BarbaraKerstie ¨ns, Johns for months, the hospital was without running water or electricity,
Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, Dept. of International Health, and no functional waste disposal system or latrines existed.
Division of Health Systems, 614 N. Wolfe St., Baltimore, MD 21205 Kikwit II Hospital and all other health care facilities in the town (bkerstie@jhsph.edu).
had been closed temporarily from 8 May onward in order to limit
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tion, where care could be provided under the best available condi- Table 1. Content of initial shipment sent to Kikwit, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, 1995, by Me ￿decins sans Frontie `res for the tions in order to limit the risk of transmission. The stigmatization
implementation of an intervention to reduce Ebola hemorrhagic fever of patients and families and the collapse of the hospital system
transmission. were already leading to possible EBO cases being hidden in homes
without any precautions taken to prevent infection of family mem-
Description Quantity bers and frustrating attempts to assess the progress of the epidemic.
The transformation of pavilion 3 of Kikwit General Hospital into
Dispensary tent, 27.5 m
2 6
an effective isolation ward was considered a top priority. Camp installation module 2
The team organized an isolation ward divided into three areas Logistic materiel module (module 001) 1
(ﬁgure 1). The existing brick building (the infected area), with a Cholera administrative module (module 001) 1
20-bed capacity, accommodated the patients. Four tents were Disinfection module (module 001) 1
erected in order to create a ‘‘clean area’’ for the health staff and Tool kit, small project 1
Water chlorination and control kit 1 a neutral area for family members. As is customary in most African
2-m
3 water bladder kit 3 hospitals, meals and much of the day-to-day patient care were
Distribution ramp module 1 provided by relatives. An independent chlorinated water supply, a
3.3-kVa diesel generator kit 1 waste disposal system, showers, and latrines were set up for each
Module for lighting, 1300 W 1 area. The water supply was guaranteed through a system of water
Camp beds, dispensary 30
cisterns that were ﬁlled from the hospital’s regular water supply
Surgical aprons, rubber 100
system. This water supply had been restored when MSF paid for Surgical caps, nondisposable 100
18 barrels of fuel to operate the generators pumping water into Disposable plastic aprons 50
the town’s canal system. The clean area and the neutral area were PCM2000 orange ﬂuid-shield protection masks, high ﬁltration 1200
mainly used for rest and changing clothes. Individuals going from Disposable blouses, nonwoven, long sleeved 100
Disposable surgical masks 1000 one area to the other had to wade through a tray ﬁlled with disinfec-
Nondisposable surgical trousers 100 tant (Pedi-Luve or foot bath). The material used had been devel-
Body bags, white 200 oped, adapted, and tested by MSF during previous emergency
Plastic 100-L garbage bags 100 interventions [1]. The organization of the isolation ward remained
Plastic goggles 50 the same throughout the outbreak.
Rubber kitchen gloves, large 100
Calcium hypochlorite 70% was the main disinfectant used. Nondisposable surgical gowns, long sleeved 100
Three solutions of different concentrations were prepared each Disposable protection gloves, latex, large 5000
day: the 0.02% solution for disinfection of hands; the 0.2% solution Disposable surgical latex gloves, size 8 1000
for disinfection of ﬂoors, clothing, noninfected latrines, and the Disposable surgical latex gloves, size 7 1000
foot bath; and the 2% solution for disinfection of the latrines used Rubber boots, size 41 40
Rubber boots, size 42 40 by the patients and for safe body burial (the body was sprayed
Rubber boots, size 44 40 with the solution before being transferred into a body bag, which
Protection socks 200 was sprayed after closure).
Jerrycan, 20 L 20 A shortage of individual-protection equipment had been antici-
Sprayer, 12 L 6 pated, and a ﬁrst shipment arrived in Kikwit (from Brussels via
Cresol 50%, soapy solution 100
Kinshasa) the day after the arrival of the MSF team. The equipment Food ration, 1 day 1000
consisted of disposable nonsterile and sterile gloves; surgical 22-L coolbox and 24 ice packs 2
masks of different types (cotton, disposable single layer, disposable Mat for dispensary tent 6
with HEPA ﬁlter); long-sleeved cotton surgical blouses; cotton
surgical trousers; long, plastic aprons; rubber boots; rubber kitchen
gloves; plastic goggles; and body bags. This protective equipment
were reportedly lying unburied in town. No formal surveillance was distributed to the hospital staff and Red Cross volunteers in
system had been set up; an appropriate case deﬁnition was in charge of body burial. During the ﬁrst 10 days of the intervention,
the process of being established by experts. An information and 99% of the protective equipment that was distributed in Kikwit
communication campaign about the outbreak had been initiated in was ﬂown in by MSF. Overall equipment needs were high during
Kikwit on 8 May. the outbreak. The MSF contribution was joined by large amounts
A committee of national and international experts, the Interna- of equipment and drugs from other international agencies. MSF’s
tional Scientiﬁc and Technical Committee, was in charge of patient contribution (through its donors) in equipment totaled 5342 kg and
care and surveillance. was worth US$47,200.
Groups of persons were identiﬁed according to their estimated
risk of infection so that the supplies could be allocated in a rational The MSF Intervention
way. Risk was estimated on the assumption that certain persons
were at higher risk of infection because of their work site and the Relying on previous MSF experience in outbreak control and
type of activity they performed (e.g., body burial was considered the needs assessment, the MSF team decided to reinforce the sur-
more dangerous than interviewing a household). We worked with veillance system and to limit the risk of virus transmission inside
CDC staff in Kikwit to establish standard lists of equipment to be health facilities and at the household level.
used by each individual (table 2). Using this list, equipment was The prospects for control of the outbreak in this urban setting
seemed impossible if all patients could not be drawn to one loca- distributed to the staff working in the isolation ward, the family
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Figure 1. Layout of isolation ward for care of Ebola hemorrhagic fever patients, Kikwit General Hospital, Kikwit, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, 1995. Sh.* denotes shower; **HTH denotes calcium hypochlorite.
members staying with the patients, and the staff of the emergency The emergency ward of Kikwit General Hospital and Kikwit II
Hospital and 12 sentinel health centers were reopened in Kikwit ward. The Red Cross volunteers in charge of body burial were
provided with full protective equipment, body bags, and technical and its surrounding areas to improve surveillance and triage of
suspected EBO patients to the isolation ward and to provide emer- advice on safe burial practices.
Once the equipment was disbursed, it was necessary to establish gency care for other medical emergencies. These facilities also
received disinfectant, waste-disposal containers, and protective conﬁdence in the local hospital staff and to train them. This was
initially accomplished largely by 2 CDC physicians, who cleaned equipment (table 2).
Households identiﬁed through the active surveillance system as and rehabilitated the ward and provided hands-on examples to the
hospital staff. It is important to note that for the ﬁrst time, it was being at risk of infection or who refused to bring suspected EBO
cases to the hospital were provided with a ‘‘household kit,’’ which shown that EBO patients can be cared for safely if protective gear
is available and used properly [2]. contained a plastic basin, a water container, rubber kitchen gloves,
disposable surgical masks, and chloramine tablets for water disin- MSF staff continued to manage the logistics of the hospital and
other health facilities until 8 August. The maintenance of electrical fection. The contents of the household kit were determined by
taking into account the fact that relatives of a suspected case were power, disbursal of equipment, provision of drugs, preparation of
disinfectant, disposal of medical waste, and other tasks were essen- unlikely to use invasive procedures in dealing with the patient and
that they needed supplies simple enough to use (e.g., kitchen gloves tial to continuing safe operation of the isolation ward.
On 20 May, the International Scientiﬁc and Technical Commit- vs. surgical gloves) to guarantee effective use.
Training sessions on the proper use of protective equipment and tee decided to reopen Kikwit II Hospital in order to attend surgical,
obstetric, and other non-EBO emergency cases. Indeed, in a town disinfectants were necessary for the staff working in these sites
and for the Red Cross volunteers who were involved in body the size of Kikwit, the number of deaths due to such untreated
emergencies soon might have outnumbered the deaths due to EHF. burial. The sessions were organized by the international committee.
Participation in the surveillance system in the health centers also MSF worked with other international organizations in the reorgani-
zation of the surgical ward of this hospital. The ward was set up, provided an opportunity to review the health workers’ knowledge of
the case deﬁnition and consistent use of the registration and reporting through provision of water and distribution of disposable medical
supplies and protective equipment, to ensure the use of safe nursing tools. Suspected cases were referred to Kikwit General Hospital and
reported to the International Scientiﬁc and Technical Committee. techniques in dealing with non-EHF patients.
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Table 2. Distribution scheme for protective equipment initially used in care of patients with Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Kikwit, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, 1995.
Isolation ward
‘‘Garde Emergency Health Home Home health
Individuals involved with Isolation Cleaning malade’’* Burial ward center visitor care giver
Protective equipment
Plastic goggles X X X X
Surgical mask with HEPA ﬁlter X X X X
Disposable surgical mask XX X
Disposable gloves X X X X X X
Surgical cap X X X
Long-sleeved surgical blouse (cotton) X X X X X X
Surgical trousers (cotton) X X X
Long plastic aprons (multiple use) X X X X X
Rubber boots X X
Rubber kitchen gloves X X X
Burial
Body bags XX
Disinfectant and other material
Hypochlorite X X X X
Chloramine tablets X X X
Jerrycan, 20 L XX
Plastic basin XX
Soap X X X X X
Plastic container (100 L) with tap X X
Sprayer X X
* Relative taking care of patient.
barrier-nursing techniques. However, an emergency situation is Discussion
not the ideal setting to solve such a structural problem. A ﬁeld
At the beginning of the MSF intervention, the high risk of virus manual appropriate for the African health care setting has been
transmission to patient care providers was well recognized and developed and may provide a means to train staff before another
corroborated by the high number of care providers who contracted epidemic and upgrade the level of routine nursing protection [4].
the disease [3]; however, the exact mechanism of transmission Although not directly in charge of either patient care or body
was not known. Close contact was considered to be contact with burial, MSF initially provided the staff involved in these activities
blood, feces, vomitus, or any other body ﬂuid. Different groups with ﬁnancial incentives. It was considered impossible to expect
were ranked from lowest to highest likelihood of infectious state. someone to work without appropriate remuneration, especially
The medical and paramedical staff was considered to have the when exposed to such high risks. With remuneration, reliable
lowest likelihood of being infectious, and suspected EHF cases teams of health care workers who were motivated to carry out the
and relatives taking care of patients, respectively, were considered jobs assigned to them were established. The amounts paid were
to have the highest and the intermediate likelihoods, respectively, within the range of what was usually paid in DRC.
of being infectious. MSF worked on the principle that the more The MSF intervention probably contributed to the reduction of
these 3 population groups could be separated, the more the risk transmission of EBO virus. An indirect way to measure this is to
of virus transmission through contact with body ﬂuids could be look at the second-generation infections among individuals in-
reduced. Considering the high infectiousness of the EBO virus, it volved in patient care or in body burial. Before 12 May 1995, 67
seemed mandatory to isolate suspected EHF patients completely health workers had been infected, of which 47 died. After the start
from patients with other illnesses. The question arose as to whether of the distribution of the protective equipment and the organization
to keep these two units at the same site or in two physically of the isolation ward on 12 May, just 3 cases of EHF were reported
separate sites. Keeping the units separate allowed for a better among staff, and none were reported among Red Cross volunteers
control of the ﬂow of patients and their families. However, it may involved in body burial [5].
have created confusion among the general population, which had The delegation of decision-making to the ﬁeld level, the speed
to make a decision where to go in case of illness. of reaction, and the creativity and collaboration may have played
An important issue was the lack of use of aseptic-nursing tech- an essential role in the effectiveness of the intervention. MSF
niques during surgical and obstetrical care and patient care in organization is directed at maintaining these elements through sev-
general, especially during the care of EBO cases. A direct conse- eral means. For example, its director must have solid ﬁeld experi-
quence of this was the high transmission of EBO virus in health ence to maintain timely knowledge of ﬁeld conditions. MSF has
care facilities. Health staff needed the necessary protective equip- formed an ‘‘emergency pool,’’ consisting of several medical and
nonmedical professionals with a minimum of 3 years of ﬁeld expe- ment and antiseptics, and they needed to be trained in correct
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rience and with experience in emergency interventions, to be sent If the MSF intervention contributed to the control of the out-
break, it could not have happened without the collaboration and out in such types of emergencies. Between the alert and the initia-
tion of the distribution of protective equipment, only 6 days exchange of expertise, between the national and international mem-
bers united in the International Scientiﬁc and Technical Committee elapsed. Since no guidelines on the control of an EHF outbreak
existed, the decision on the actions to be taken were based on the in Kikwit.
initial assessment, knowledge of the EBO virus, previous MSF
experience in outbreak control, and information on what was al-
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